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ARTICLES
"SILENT" SECOND LIENS - WILL BANKRUPTCY
COURTS KEEP THE PEACE?
DAVID LINE BATrY' AND Jo ANN J. BRIGHTON 2
Over the past few years, a trend has developed to use financing
secured by subordinated second liens, as an alternative to unsecured
subordinated mezzanine financing, unsecured high yield debt, and other
unsecured debt.3 Second liens are also used to increase the overall size
of a senior secured credit facility by differentiating between two classes
of term loans within the same credit facility.4 These liens are frequently
referred to as "silent second liens" because the second lien holder has
agreed to refrain from exercising rights and remedies against collateral -
in other words, to remain "silent" - until the holders of the senior first
lien are paid in full. Part I of this Article will briefly discuss the
evolution of the second lien market, and Part II will discuss how
bankruptcy considerations drive the key intercreditor terms of second
liens. Part III will discuss the likelihood of enforceability of the
"silence" provided for in the second lien documentation in a bankruptcy
case. Finally, Part IV will conclude that the second lien market can
benefit both lenders and borrowers.
1. Mr. Batty is a partner with Kennedy Covington Lobdell & Hickman, L.L.P.,
Charlotte, North Carolina in the Financial Services Department - Banking and Finance
Group where he practices primarily in the areas of syndicated lending, banking, and
corporate finance.
2. Ms. Brighton is special counsel with Kennedy Covington Lobdell & Hickman,
Charlotte, North Carolina in the Financial Services Department - Financial Restructuring
Group where she practices primarily in the area of bankruptcy, workouts and secured
lending. She is a contributing editor for the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, serves
on its Editorial Board, on the Advisory Board for the ABI Law Review, is certified in
Business Bankruptcy by the American Board of Certification, and is a frequent author and
lecturer on bankruptcy related topics.
3. See Howard Seife, Silent Second Liens, 121 BANKING L. J. 771, 772 (2004).
4. Id.
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE SECOND LIEN MARKET
Companies have a variety of options for structuring financing in
a way that provides the most benefits for their particular businesses.
With the changes in the financial markets over the past several years,
more creativity has been brought to bear than ever before. Economic
downturns that lasted longer than originally anticipated caused cash
flows and collateral values to fall drastically.5 In response to escalating
rates of default, lenders tightened credit polices and, for a time,
leveraged cash flow lending essentially disappeared from the lending
landscape.6 The result of this credit crunch was that by 2003, many
public and private companies were in a quandary as to how to refinance
their debt as it matured.7
The syndicated loan market was further depressed throughout
this period by the lack of demand for new debt from borrowers that
were not forced to refinance because of an impending debt maturity.8
As corporate profits suffered during the recent recession, non-
investment grade merger and acquisition activity (a significant source of
lending demand in any market) initially waned as private equity
investors waited to see how far equity prices would fall.9 Even after
5. See Meredith Coffey, Loan Market 2000: Defaults Rise, Angels Fall; Lenders Seek
Safety in LowLeverage, Stolid Sectors, GOLD SHEETS, Jan. 8, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Loan
Market 2000]; see also Meredith Coffey, Cirque 2001: High-Grade Takes Center Ring, As
Balance Sheets Turn and Borrowers Tumble, GOLD SHEETS, Jan. 7, 2002, at I [hereinafter
Cirque 2001]; see also Meredith Coffey, Gravity's Rainbow? As Markets Tumble, Lending
Slips But Angels' Fall is Leveraged's Redemption, GOLD SHEETS, Jan. 6, 2003, at I
[hereinafter Gravity's Rainbow?].
6. See Loan Market 2000, supra note 5, at 18-21; see also Cirque 2001, supra note 5,
at I (following September 11, 2001, the "leveraged loan market collapsed").
7. See Completing The Capital Structure With A Second Lien Loan, CAPITALEYES
(Bank of America Bus. Capital Monthly Newsletter), Apr. 2003, at
http://www.bofabusinesscapital.com/resources/capeyes/a04-03-158.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2005) [hereinafter Completing the Capital Structure].
8. See Cirque 2001, supra note 5, at 1, 19; see also Gravity's Rainbow?, supra note 5,
at 1, 18; Meredith Coffey, From Bear Baiting to Bull Run: 12 Months of Fundamentals,
Technicals - and Recovery, GOLD SHEETS, Jan. 5, 2004, at 18 [hereinafter From Bear
Baiting to Bull Run].
9. See Cirque 2001, supra note 5, at 19 (quoting Thompson Financial:
U.S. merger activity fell by 57% from 2000 levels, and loans backing
M&A tumbled by one-third to only $146 billion. Unsurprisingly, the
leveraged sector was hard hit, with M&A lending falling more than
40%. Within the leveraged segment, LBO activity was even harder hit:
Less than $13 billion come from that sector, leaving financial sponsors
sitting on considerable war chests, but with few deals.).
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purchase prices sunk to levels that encouraged buyers to re-enter the
market, these buyers found lenders unwilling to finance acquisitions
with high levels of total debt.1° Instead, lenders insisted on seeing more
equity dollars invested in the deal." Faced with the prospect of putting
more of their own funds in the game, private equity groups became even
more critical of new deals and sought creative solutions to finance
quality deals.
12
One solution which emerged during this period was a traditional
asset based loan in conjunction with a second lien financing. This
approach succeeded because the tight credit policies and asset based
approach of senior lenders prior to 2003 meant that collateral frequently
had considerable value in excess of that needed to ensure that the senior
lenders would be paid in full. 13 Borrowers and lenders used second
liens to unlock the value of this "excess" collateral and provide much
needed liquidity. Although second liens loans were offered at interest
rates in excess of the then current senior debt market (to reflect the
increased risk to the second lien position), these rates were far below
what had been demanded for unsecured subordinated mezzanine debt,
and by the fourth quarter of 2003, second lien debt was being used not
only to solve liquidity problems but also to replace subordinated
mezzanine debt in typical leveraged buy-out transactions. 14 In short, the
pricing of second lien loans hit the sweet spot by appealing to lenders
and borrowers alike.
See also Gravity's Rainbow?, supra note 5, at 1, 19; see also From Bear Baiting to Bull
Run, supra note 8, at 18.
10. See Sadaf Khan, More attractive assets, easier financing facilitate mid-cap LBOs
reload, GOLD SHEETS, June 2, 2003, at 1, 22 [hereinafter LBOs reload] (noting that "[Ilender
wariness has translated into conservative deal structures for sponsored credits, with the
average maximum total debt to EBITDA covenant restricted to 4.28 times. This is just a
hair's breadth higher than 2002's 4.4 times, but far more restrictive than 1999's 5.11 times
average.").
11. See id. (stating that "[l]enders' demands are similar to, if not more stringent than,
their demands the past few quarters - high equity infusions, low leverage levels and high
compensation in margin.").
12. See id. at 24 (stating that "[b]urned by a previous crop of deals, sponsor shops and
lenders have become more cautious, placing more emphasis on due diligence than on return.
So if there is an LBO surge, it is likely to be a muted one." ).
13. Seife, supra note 3; see also Cirque 2001, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that "the best
of deals are done in the worst of times").
14. STANDARD & POOR'S LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA, SECOND-LIEN LOANS
BLOSSOM; TREND LOOKS TO CONTINUE IN '04 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter STANDARD & POOR'S
2003].
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While second liens were initially used primarily to pay off
existing debt or provide incremental liquidity, as corporations and
lenders grew more comfortable with second lien financings, they came
to be used in a broader range of circumstances. 5 The second lien
market also grew as non-bank lenders such as hedge funds, specialized
finance companies, and even subordinated mezzanine debt funds, were
drawn to the structure by the relatively high margins offered on second
lien debt.16 Because these private investors are not regulated and are not
constrained by internal credit risk ratings, they are free to look for true
risk/return oriented structures and can review each potential deal on its
own merits.' 7 The familiarity lenders and borrowers gained with second
lien structures in 2003, coupled with the relaxation of credit standards in
response to a strengthening economy, drove a dramatic expansion of the
second lien market from approximately $3.2 billion in all of 200318 to
almost $12 billion' 9 in 2004. In fact, second lien financings have
become so popular that full collateral coverage for both the first and
second lien debt no longer appears to be an absolute pre-condition of
such financing. Accordingly, the creativity of lenders and borrowers
alike has given birth to a new loan structure that is likely to be around
for some time.
II. MECHANICS OF "SILENT" SECOND LIENS
A. What Is a "Silent" Second Lien?
The terms "first" lien and "second" lien are simply a shorthand
15. Id. (observing that lender willingness to use second lien financing in "mainstream"
deal had replaced a more limited use of second lien financing as rescue financing for
borrowers "facing liquidity problems"); see Why Today's Borrowers and Investors are
Leaning Toward Second Liens, CAPITALEYES (Bank of America Bus. Capital Newsletter),
Feb., 2004, at http://www.bofabusinesscapital.com/resources/capeyes/a02-04-210.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Toward Second Liens].
16. STANDARD & POOR'S 2003, supra note 14.
17. Toward Second Liens, supra note 15.
18. STANDARD & POOR'S 2003, supra note 14. But see STANDARD & POOR'S
LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA, A VERY GOOD YEAR: 2004 LEVERAGED LENDING, BY
THE NUMBERS (Dec. 2004) (noting that the volume of second lien financing declined
throughout the course of 2004) [hereinafter STANDARD & POOR'S 2004]; Christopher J.
Rockers & Christine Gould Hamm, Exploring the Possibilities for No. 2: All about second
lien loans, 14 Bus. L. Today 35 (Jan./Feb. 2005).
19. Standard & Poor's 2004, supra note 18; see also Rockers & Hamm, supra note 18.
"SILENT" SECOND LIENS
way to describe the relative priority of two separate liens on the same
collateral. The relative priorities could simply be the result of the time
or method of perfection of the lien, ° or the result of the express
agreement of the parties. In the second lien financings discussed in this
Article, the second lien ranks junior to the first lien because the second
lien holders have contractually agreed to subordinate their rights and
remedies with respect to the collateral to the rights and remedies of the
first lien holders until the debt secured by the first lien is paid in full.
2
'
The scope of this lien subordination is narrower than debt
subordination, because subordinated debt generally does not receive any
payment until the senior debt has been paid in full.22 The significance
of this distinction becomes apparent if the proceeds of the collateral are
insufficient to pay off the senior debt in full. If the senior debt benefits
from debt subordination, the benefits of subordination will continue
notwithstanding the collateral shortfall. Conversely, if the senior debt
only benefits from lien subordination, that subordination ends the
moment the collateral runs out. Once the collateral has been fully
liquidated, both the first lien and second lien holders become unsecured
creditors and their claims will rank pari passu.
Generally, secured second liens are structured one of two ways.
The most common structure is for the first lien to be secured by all the
available assets and the second lien to rely on incremental dollars
against the same collateral pool - very similar in concept to a second
mortgage on a home. In a typical second lien transaction, a bank or
other lender (or a lending group) takes a first lien on all or substantially
all of a borrower's assets. The debt may or may not be guaranteed by
20. See, e.g. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2001).
21. In the current market, second lien financing tends to either be in the form of term
loan held by institutional investors in the context of a syndicated credit facility or a high-
yield debt issuance. See Neil Cummings & Kirk Davenport, How to Structure U.S. Second
Lien Financings, I.F.L.R. (Latham & Watkins, New York, N.Y. & L.A., Cal.), June 2004, at
26, available at http://www.lw.com/resource/publicationslpdf/pub998-I.pdf [last visited
Jan. 20, 2005]. Typically, the intercreditor provisions governing a second lien term loan are
more heavily negotiated by the second lien holders than the intercreditor provisions of
second lien high yield offerings. See id. at 27 ("second lien bond deals tend to be more
silent than second lien term loan deals").
22. The scope of debt subordination terms frequently vary depending on the type of
debt involved. In fact, many types of subordinated debt are permitted to receive some
payments (usually current interest) prior to the payment in full of the senior debt, as long as
no default has occurred and is continuing under the senior debt. See Cummings &
Davenport, supra note 21, at 26.
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affiliated companies or additionally secured by their assets, and the
borrower generally has other creditors such as trade or general
unsecured creditors.2 3 Another lender (or another lending group),
consortium, hedge fund, bond group or other investors (acting for itself
or for public or private capital markets) then extends credit to the same
borrower, taking a second lien on all or substantially all of the assets
upon which the first secured creditor has a lien. 4
The second, less common, structure is for the first and second
liens to be secured by different pools of collateral. For example, one
loan is secured by receivables and inventory and another uses the fixed
assets such as property, plant and equipment for collateral.2 5 The types
of collateral are varied and can encompass any type of collateral
traditionally used to secure an asset based loan. 6
B. Bankruptcy Considerations Which Drive the Terms of Lien
Subordination
A second lien is described as "silent" when the second lien
holder contractually agrees to subordinate many of the rights it has as a
secured creditor upon an event of default or in the event of a bankruptcy
case commenced by, or against, the borrower to the first lien holder.2 7
The terms of this contractual subordination are typically reflected in an
intercreditor agreement, which will also include terms that govern the
relationship of the first lien and second lien holders prior to default.2 8
23. See Seife, supra note 3, at 772.
24. Id.
25. Completing the Capital Structure, supra note 7.
26. Id.
27. An example of such a subordination provision is as follows:
To the extent- that the [Prepetition Junior Lender] has or acquires any
rights under Section 363 or Section 364 of the Code (as defined below)
with respect to the Collateral, the [Prepetition Junior Lender] hereby
agrees not to assert such rights without the prior written consent of the
[Prepetition Senior Lender], provided that, if requested by the
[Prepetition Senior Lender], the [Prepetition Junior Lender] shall seek to
exercise such rights in the manner requested by the [Prepetition Senior
Lender].
28. Because second lien financings are still a relatively recent development, there is not
yet broad consensus on all aspects of these intercreditor agreements. See Kirk Davenport,
The Silence of the Liens, N.Y. L.J., Jul. 9, 2004. ("second lien ... markets are still making
and we have not reached the point where there is a standard checklist of 'market'
intercreditor terms"). Because second lien loans tend to have the most highly negotiated
[Vol. 9
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The central characteristic of any contractual subordination
agreement (whether debt subordination or lien subordination) is that the
senior lender will want to ensure that its rights and remedies are as free
from interference by the subordinated lender as possible.29
Additionally, the senior lender will want the ability to exercise control
over the actions of the subordinated lenders. Conversely, subordinated
lenders seek to limit the control of the senior lender, as well as to obtain
limits over actions of the senior lenders that have the effect of
"deepening" the terms of subordination in effect at closing. The
essence of the negotiation of subordination terms is to strike a balance
between these competing goals. When second lien financings first
gained hold, the balance tended to be skewed in favor of the first lien
holder. More recently, as second lien holders have gained more
experience with the subordinated lien structure, the balance has moved
in the direction of the second lien holder.
Consistent with the first lien holder's desire to control its own
destiny, typical second lien intercreditor agreements will require the
second lien holder to release its second lien on the collateral whenever
the first lien holder has elected to release the first lien on such collateral
pursuant to the terms of the first lien loan documents. Although this
provision is fairly broadly drafted in favor of the first lien holder, there
are some limits. For example, the first lien holder is usually not
permitted to release all of the collateral without the consent of the
second lien holder. The first lien holder will also seek to control the
terms of the second lien collateral documents, specifically, the right to
approve any modifications to the documents evidencing the creation and
governing the terms of the second lien. At a minimum, the first lien
holder will usually insist on the right to approve modifications which
are adverse or otherwise inconsistent with the agreed upon priority of
the first lien relative to the second lien. Furthermore, the first lien
holder will strive to preserve the status quo by requiring provisions that
prohibit the second lien holder from challenging the priority of the first
intercreditor agreements, this discussion of intercreditor provisions in this Article focuses on
the intercreditor provisions applicable to second lien term loans. See Cummings &
Davenport, supra note 21.
29. See Cummings & Davenport, supra note 21, at 26 (stating that first lien holders
protect their interest through a "lien subordination agreement that strips the second lien
creditors of most of the rights they might otherwise exercise to the detriment of the first lien
creditors").
2005]
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lien or from taking a lien on any assets that do not also secure the first
lien debt. As the purpose of these provisions is to ensure that the
second lien holder cannot attempt to modify the deal to the detriment of
the first lien holder after closing, these provisions are typically
acceptable to the second lien holder.
The desire to preserve the status quo works both ways, however.
At the time of closing, a second lien holder can readily determine the
amount of debt that will be secured by prior liens. To the extent that the
amount of debt secured by a first lien increases, the likelihood that the
collateral can support a full recovery by the second lien holders
diminishes. Therefore, the second lien holder will insist upon
restrictions on the amount of additional first lien debt. Although it is in
the interest of all parties to provide some incremental first lien
availability,3 ° the first lien holder will typically agree to some outside
limit on the amount of debt that can be secured by the first lien without
the consent of the second lien holder.
The foregoing provisions all govern issues that are reasonably
likely to arise during the ordinary course of a performing loan
transaction. The real action, of course, arises when things do not go
according to plan. Given the high leverage of transactions involving
silent second liens, a nonperforming borrower is likely to be left in a
position where bankruptcy protection may be the only option.
Therefore, it is also necessary for the first lien and second lien holders
to anticipate the effect of a bankruptcy proceeding on their intercreditor
agreement when negotiating the subordination terms.3'
1. Subordination of Remedies
The heart of any second lien intercreditor agreement is the
specific agreement of the second lien holders to subordinate their right
30. Because of the existing lending relationship between the borrower and the first lien
holders, additional first lien debt can frequently be obtained quickly and less expensively
than new debt. These factors can be critically important if the borrower needs additional
liquidity to fund a strategic acquisition, for example. Similarly, existing first lien holders
are often the best source of an incremental amount of "workout" financing that may allow
the borrower to weather a short downturn in performance that could be magnified into a
larger problem without such additional liquidity.
31. See infra Part III.B. (discussing and analyzing the enforceability of the critical terms
of contractual lien subordination).
"SILENT" SECOND LIENS
to exercise remedies with respect to the collateral until the payment in
full of the first lien debt. The exclusive right of the first lien holder to
exercise foreclosure and other rights upon default is, in fact, the
hallmark of the "silent" second lien financing structure. In the initial
phases of the second lien market, first lien holders insisted upon and
received unlimited "blockage periods' 32 during which the second lien
holders were required to sit silently on their rights and remedies whether
or not the first lien holders were actively pursuing their rights and
remedies with respect to the common collateral. As the second lien
market has evolved, however, second lien holders have pushed back on
this one-sided approach. Now, the more common approach is for the
duration of the remedy blockage to be limited to a finite number of days
during which the first lien holder must initiate action or lose its
exclusive right to proceed against the common collateral.33
In addition to demanding the exclusive right to exercise
remedies with respect to the collateral, the first lien holders do not want
the second lien holders to second guess the manner in which the first
lien holders exercise their rights. To protect the finality of the
enforcement and foreclosure actions of the first lien holders, the second
lien holders are generally precluded from challenging or objecting to
these actions.34 Anything short of such prohibition leaves the first lien
holder open to collateral attack by the second lien holder if the proceeds
32. See Rocker & Hamm, supra note 18, at 36 (labeling this waiting period the
standstill period).
33. Because virtually all non-insider debt subordination agreements include a similar
limit on the duration of the remedy blockage period, it is not surprising that the second lien
subordination market has moved in the same direction. Although a duration of one-hundred
and eighty (180) days is a good benchmark for the minimum duration of the remedy
standstill period, the length of the remedy standstill is often subject to intense negotiation
and the consensus on this point is still evolving. Furthermore, as the expiration of the
blockage period will force the first lien holder to initiate action or risk losing its exclusive
right to act, the borrower has an interest in seeing a longer blockage period.
34. On this front, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code comes to the aid of the
second lien holders. More specifically, Section 9-602 of the UCC provides that the
following obligations imposed upon the first lien holder may not be waived: Section 9-611
(requiring notification to junior lienholders before disposing of collateral) and Section 9-
610(b) (requiring commercial reasonableness in disposing of collateral ). Additionally, the
right of a senior secured party to strict foreclosure of the collateral is subject to the fight of a
subordinated secured party's right to object to such remedy. See U.C.C. § 9-620 (2001). A
senior secured party can be liable for damages to a subordinate secured party for breach of
the obligations imposed on such senior secured party under Article 9 of the UCC. See
U.C.C. § 9-625 (2001).
2005]
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of the collateral are insufficient to satisfy both the first lien and second
lien claims.
2. First Lien Holder's Right to Seek Relief from the Automatic Stay
When a borrower files a petition for relief under the United
States Bankruptcy Code (the Bankruptcy Code),35 a stay springs into
place (commonly referred to as the "automatic stay") which bars any
creditor from taking any action against the debtor, or any property of the
debtor, which is designed to afford the debtor "breathing room" from
creditor pressure to give a debtor time to formulate a plan of
reorganization or orderly liquidation.36 A creditor can request relief
from the automatic stay to exercise its rights and remedies against a
debtor, or property of the debtor, if it can demonstrate, inter alia that
"cause" exists to grant such relief.37
First lien holders want the flexibility to lift the automatic stay
without the interference of the second lien holders to permit the
piecemeal foreclosure on specific items of collateral if necessary. Thus,
the first lien holder will negotiate for an intercreditor agreement that
includes an advance waiver by the second lien holder of its right to
contest any lifting of the stay requested by the first lien holder.
Although second lien holder might object to providing such advance
waiver due to the possibility that a collateral sale will not be done to
protect the residual value of the collateral, this objection will almost
certainly be rejected by the first lien holder.
3. Financing the Debtor's Operations Following the Commencement of
a Bankruptcy Proceeding
In a bankruptcy case, a debtor can use cash which is otherwise
pledged as collateral to its lender, if certain requirements are met under
the Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy court enters an order
approving the use of such "cash collateral. 38 Further, a debtor may
obtain additional financing post-petition which allows the debtor to
35. 11 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (2001).
36. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 541 (2001).
37. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 363 (2001).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2001).
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continue operations and funds the financial needs of the debtor pending
the approval of a plan of reorganization or liquidation (debtor in
possession or DIP financing).3 9 Therefore, following the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, the very next filings are typically cash collateral
and DIP financing motions to enable the debtor to fund the continuing
operations after the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. The
financing takes the form of a DIP Financing Order. The lender or
lenders providing such DIP financing will get a super-priority "priming"
lien on collateral senior to other secured lenders, including the
prepetition first lien loans and second lien loans. To obtain this priming
lien, as well as to use the cash collateral, the debtor must show that
those other secured creditors are "adequately protected" - i.e., that such
secured creditors will not suffer loss of collateral value while a
borrower is in bankruptcy and that the financing could not be obtained
from any other source on any more favorable terms.4 °
To protect its position and maintain control of the process, the
first lien holder will often want to provide the DIP financing as well as
control the use of cash collateral. Therefore, first lien holders have
historically insisted on restrictions on the ability of the second lien
holders to argue that they are not adequately protected or to otherwise
disrupt the first lien holder's control of the process (such as by
submitting a competing DIP financing motion).41 Consistent with the
evolution of the second lien market discussed elsewhere in this Article,
second lien holders have increasingly rejected absolute restrictions on
their right to adequate protection. After a period of accepting
limitations that ensured that second lien holders would not interfere
with DIP financings supported by the first lien holders, many second
lien holders now seek to retain their general rights to adequate
protection. This area continues to be unsettled, and the overall
39. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2001).
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361,363, 364.
41. An example of such agreement is as follows:
The [Prepetition Junior Lender] hereby consents to the extension of
debtor-in-possession financing by one or more of the [Prepetition Senior
Lenders] pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (the "Code") and the use of
the [Prepetition Senior Lenders'] cash collateral pursuant to the Code,
and to the granting of super priority administrative claims and liens
senior to the liens of the [Prepetition Senior Lenders] in the Collateral.
2005]
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enforceability of the adequate protection waivers is discussed below.4 2
4. The Importance of Post-Petition Interest
Interest that would accrue after a filing of a bankruptcy petition
is commonly referred to as "post-petition interest." Depending on the
size of the loan, and the length of the bankruptcy case, post-petition
interest can easily grow into a significant claim in bankruptcy. The
Bankruptcy Code provides that interest can be paid currently during the
bankruptcy proceeding to secured creditors so long as certain criteria are
satisfied.43  For a creditor to be allowed post-petition interest, the
bankruptcy court must find that the value of the collateral exceeds the
amount of the claim of such creditor - in other words, that the creditor
is "oversecured." 44 Obviously, the inclusion of both the first liens and
the second liens in same class of creditors would require the collateral
pool to cover both the first lien claims and the second lien claims (not
just the first lien claims) for a bankruptcy court to determine that such
creditors are oversecured.45
To support a finding that the first lien and second lien debt are
separate classes of claims, the first lien holder should require that the
intercreditor agreement include an express statement that the first lien
and second lien claims are distinct claims as well as an express
agreement that such claims will be classified as separate claims in a
bankruptcy proceeding.46 Additionally, having separate loan documents
(and separate agents in syndicated transactions) enhances the argument
that the first lien claims and the second lien claims should be classified
separately. That is one reason why second lien transactions typically
include two sets of separate loan and collateral documents.
42. See infra Part III.B. 1-2.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2001).
44. Id.
45. See infra Part III.B.3. The payment of post-petition interest may also be limited by
the Rule of Explicitness and a recent decision issued by the First Circuit. Id.
46. See Rockers & Hamm, supra note 18, at 37 (citing the case of In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 528 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) as an example of the importance of the
intercreditor agreement expressly stating distinct first and second lien claims); In re
Ionosphere Clubs Inc., 134 B.R. 528 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the creditor with
first priority was not oversecured, and thus was not entitled to post-petition interest, because
all of the debt held by three separate creditors constituted only one grant of a security
interest and, thus, one claim).
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Collectively, these factors have the effect of increasing the likelihood
that the first lien holders will be able to demonstrate that the collateral is
sufficient to oversecure their claim, as well as to support separate
classification for purposes of voting rights regarding reorganization
plans.
5. The Use of Voting Restrictions, Waivers, and Agreements by the
First Lien Holders to Control the Plan Confirmation Process
For a debtor to exit Chapter 11, it must submit either a plan of
reorganization or liquidation which complies with requirements set
forth in the Bankruptcy Code.47 Similarly situated creditors are placed
in "classes" separate from other creditors that are not similarly
situated.48 For a plan to be confirmed it must receive the affirmative
vote of more than two-thirds in amount and greater than fifty percent in
number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors (subject to
good faith voting requirements).49 To ensure that the first lien holders
control the plan confirmation process, first lien holders generally want
the second lien holders to agree to support a reorganization plan in a
bankruptcy proceeding supported by the first lien holders. Otherwise
the second lien lender could block the confirmation of any plan.
Therefore, the intercreditor agreement will include restrictions on the
rights of the second lien holder with respect to voting for plans of
reorganization.5 ° Because the first lien holder may not want to take the
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129 (2001).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2001).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2001).
50. An example of such voting restrictions is as follows:
Upon the occurrence of any Insolvency Event, the [Prepetition Junior
Lender] acknowledges, agrees, authorizes and empowers irrevocably the
[Prepetition Senior Lender] (in its own name or on behalf of the
[Prepetition Junior Lender] to demand, sue for, collect and receive every
payment of distribution made in respect of the [Prepetition Junior]
Obligations to the extent out of Collateral, and to give acquittances
therefore and to file claims and proof of claim and take such other
action (including without limitation voting claims with respect to the
[Prepetition Junior] Obligations or enforcing any lien securing payment
of the [Prepetition Junior] Obligations) the [Prepetition Senior lenders]
may deem necessary or advisable, from time to time, for the exercise or
enforcement of any rights, interests or remedies hereunder with respect
to the Collateral and may consent, on behalf of the [Prepetition Junior
Lender], to subordinate the lien securing the [Prepetition Junior]
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liability risk of actually voting the claims of the second lien holder, the
first lien holder may instead require the second lien holder to support
any plan proffered by the first lien holder.
It is rare for the second lien holder to fully waive its rights to
vote in connection with a plan because the right to vote on a plan and to
object to its confirmation provides very meaningful protections for a
secured creditor. A full waiver of such rights may cause the second lien
holder to have fewer rights than an unsecured lender and trade creditors
(both of whom rarely if ever agree to limit their voting rights in a plan).
The enforceability of voting waivers is in question and discussed
below.51
A creditor with a "claim" must file a proof of claim with the
bankruptcy court before a date set by the bankruptcy court - the bar date
- in order to receive payment on the "claim., 5 2 Filing a proof of claim
on or before the bar date is important to preserve rights to payment, as
well as voting rights to any plan proposed by the debtor.53 To ensure
that the first lien holder does not lose the benefit of its ability to vote, or
direct the vote of the second lien holders, the first lien holder will
frequently require the ability to file proofs of claim on behalf of the
second lien holder.
6. Other Bankruptcy Issues
Second lien holders also commonly waive (1) the right to
oppose the sale of collateral in a § 363 sale (which is a sale of assets out
of the ordinary course of business after the bankruptcy petition is filed
and before a plan of reorganization is confirmed 54 or as part of a plan of
reorganization) and (2) to contest the value of the sale of any collateral.
Although these are common provisions in second lien intercreditor
arrangements, they have the anomalous effect of taking away rights the
second lien holder would have if it was unsecured. However, second
lien holders have generally accepted such limitations in exchange for
Obligations to any financing referred to in clause (iv) above. Nothing
herein shall obligate the [Prepetition Senior Lenders] to take any of such
actions.
51. See infra Part 1II.B.4-5.
52. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 501 (2001); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002, 3003.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2001); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018.
54. I1 U.S.C. § 363 (2001).
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the benefit of obtaining priority over unsecured creditors.
7. Benefits of a Second Lien Position in Bankruptcy
As discussed above, in order to obtain the consent of the first
lien holders to permit the second lien to exist, the second lien holders
are required to become "silent" by agreeing to the following general
terms:
* waiver of right to object to validity, priority or
enforceability of the first lien holder's position;
" consent to the first lien holder's rights to receive all
proceeds from the collateral until the first lien debt is paid in
full;
" advance waiver of objections to DIP financings if requested
or approved by the first lien holder;
* agreement to abide by the first lien holder's positions with
respect to adequate protection, use of cash collateral, sale of
assets and relief from stay;
* agreement to waive or limit rights to freely vote on any plan
of reorganization and agreement not to vote in favor of any
plan opposed by the first lien holder; or, in the alternative,
an assignment of the second lien holder's right to vote to the
senior lien holder. 5
Despite these consensual limitations, silent second liens are
attractive to junior lenders because such security affords the second lien
holders the prospect of a greater recovery than unsecured lenders and
also gives the second lien holders certain significant rights (subject to
the limitations of the agreed upon lien subordination) as secured
creditors in bankruptcy. These rights include adequate protection;
claims for post-petition interest; the right to consent to, or object to,
55. Seife, supra note 3, at 774.
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extensions of credit to a debtor in possession that prime prepetition
liens; the right to be heard on the use of collateral and the sale of
collateral by the debtor in possession; and the right to be placed in a
separate class in a reorganization plan. Collectively, the rights of a
secured party in bankruptcy are significant, and historically secured
creditors have had much higher recovery rates than unsecured
creditors.56 Nevertheless, because second lien holders bear a higher
level of risk (vis-A-vis the first lien holders) of the failure of repayment,
they are entitled to a higher rate of interest than the first lien holders.
As evidenced by the explosion of second liens in the past year, these
higher rates of interest are the factor that has most likely attracted so
many investors to the second lien market.57
III. CAN, OR WILL, BANKRUPTCY COURTS KEEP THE PEACE?
Quite simply, first lien holders would not agree to permit a
second lien without the protections afforded by an intercreditor
agreement including the provisions discussed above.58 In exchange for
agreeing to such intercreditor arrangements, the second lien holders are
permitted to take their lien and they are paid a higher rate of interest by
the borrower on their loan. In sum, the basis of the bargain for the
second lien structure is the enforceability of the intercreditor agreement.
Therefore, the critical question is: are the terms of such agreements
enforceable in bankruptcy?
A. General Enforceability of Agreements to Subordinate Payment
Congress has acknowledged the validity of subordination
agreements in § 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides:
(a) A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case
under this title to the same extent that such agreement is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Section 510(a) codified the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act holding of
56. See Cummings & Davenport, supra note 21, at 27.
57. See STANDARD & POOR'S 2003, supra note 14.
58. See supra Part II.B.
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In re Credit Industrial Corp.,5 9 which stated: "A bankruptcy court, in
order to effectuate its duty to do equity, must enforce lawful
subordination agreements according to their terms and prevent junior
creditors from receiving funds where they have 'explicitly agreed not to
accept them"' and "subordination agreements are almost uniformly
enforced by the bankruptcy courts. ' 6 ° Soon after the adoption of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a Minnesota bankruptcy court restated the
position on prepetition subordination in the Hart Ski6' case:
The intent of § 510(a) (subordination) is to allow the
consensual and contractual priority of payment to be
maintained between creditors among themselves in a
bankruptcy proceeding. There is no indication that
Congress intended to allow creditors to alter by a
subordination agreement, the bankruptcy laws unrelated
to distribution of assets.62
Payment subordination is, therefore, acknowledged and enforced in the
bankruptcy courts.
B. Enforceability of Intercreditor Agreements Extending Beyond
Payment Subordination
The established enforcement of subordination in bankruptcy
courts is subordination with respect to payment priority and not
necessarily with respect to the subordination of rights and remedies.
Whether bankruptcy courts will, or even can, enforce waivers contained
in subordination agreements concerning the exercise of the junior
creditor's rights and remedies is unclear, at best. There has long been
debate concerning the enforceability of waivers obtained by lenders
from debtors prepetition concerning the waiver of certain rights after a
bankruptcy petition is filed. In those cases, courts have been very
59. 366 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1966).
60. Id. at 408, 410 (citing Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 778, 65 S.Ct. 191, 89 L.Ed. 622 (1944); In re Aktiebolaget Krueger & Toll, 96
F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938); cf Prudential Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 97, 62 S.Ct.
978, 86 L.Ed. 1293 (1942)).
61. In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 5 B.R. 734 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
62. Id; see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 528 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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reluctant to enforce any waivers agreed to in advance of a bankruptcy
filing by a borrower and have determined, that, barring exigent
circumstances, such waivers are generally not enforceable.63 When
looking at whether bankruptcy courts will enforce such waivers when
agreed to in advance by sophisticated lenders, it certainly can be argued
that the analysis is very different and it is not necessary for the
bankruptcy court to play such a protective role. However, a strong
argument can also be made that parties, no matter how sophisticated,
should not be able to contract away statutorily afforded rights provided
by the Bankruptcy Code and essentially override the priority scheme of
the Bankruptcy Code sets forth.
Nevertheless, different courts in different locations have
reviewed the issues concerning the enforceability of waivers by second
lien holders of rights to adequate protection, to contest DIP financing
and cash collateral orders, to object to the payment of post-petition
interest to senior creditors, to vote on plans of reorganization and other
similar waivers, and the decisions have yielded differing results.
Accordingly, no definitive answer as to the enforceability of these
prepetition waivers, consents and agreements has yet been established.
1. Adequate Protection and the Automatic Stay
In the Hart Ski case, the senior creditor sought the assistance of
the bankruptcy court to prevent the junior creditor from seeking
adequate protection or the lifting of the automatic stay based on
language in the subordination agreement, which, according to the senior
creditor, deprived the junior creditor from exercising such rights.64 The
bankruptcy court refused to enforce the provisions at issue and held that
Congress never intended that parties could alter by subordination
agreement the bankruptcy laws unrelated to distribution.65 Specifically,
the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code guarantees each creditor rights
regardless of subordination and reasoned:
63. See, e.g., In re Shady Grove Tech Center Assoc. Ltd., 216 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998) opinion supplemented, 227 B.R. 422 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998); see also In re Powers,
170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (holding that prepetition agreements waiving
opposition to relief from stay may be enforceable in appropriate cases); In re Pease, 195
B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996); 1, re Desai, 282 B.R. 527 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).
64. 5 B.R. at 734 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
65. Id. at 736.
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These rights include: The right to assert and prove its
claim, the right to seek court-order protection for its
security, the right to have a stay lifted under proper
circumstances, the right to participate in the voting for
confirmation or rejection of any plan of reorganization,
the right to object to confirmation and the right to file a
plan where applicable.. . [these] rights and others not
related to contract priority of distributions pursuant to
Section 510(a) cannot be affected by the actions of the
parties prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case
when such rights did not even exist. To hold that as a
result of subordination agreement the 'subordinor' gives
up all its rights to the 'subordinee would be totally
inequitable.66
Nineteen years later, In re Hinderliter Technologies, Inc.,67
another bankruptcy court specifically noted "[s]ubsequent case law does
not significantly diverge from the Credit and [Hart Ski] Court's
holdings. 68 Accordingly, the statements of the Hart Ski court remain
troublesome for those seeking to enforce provisions of silent second
liens regarding adequate protection and the automatic stay in
bankruptcy court.
2. DIP and Cash Collateral Issues
More recently, in a case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
New World Pasta,69 objections were filed by junior lien holders to the
motions requesting approval of the DIP financing, the use of cash
collateral and the adequate protection finding (the "Objections"). In the
Objections, the junior lien holders acknowledged that the debtor needed
the post-petition financing on a super-priority basis, but requested that
the court strike certain provisions as "offending language" since, in the
objecting creditors' opinion, such language "potentially deprives the
66. Id.
67. 228 B.R. 848 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
68. Id.
69. In re New World Pasta, No. 04-02817 (M.D. Pa. filed May 10, 2004).
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Prepetition Junior Lenders of fundamental bankruptcy rights and
protections that cannot be traded away in prepetition agreements to the
extent that [such agreements] purport to do so."70 The "offending
language" specifically sought a waiver from the prepetition junior
lenders of the rights to adequate protection and to vote on the Chapter
11 plan. 7' The Objections acknowledged the cases cited in this article
and argued that any order approving the DIP financing and authorizing
cash collateral should not be used to obtain declaratory or injunctive
relief on these unsettled issues of the enforceability of waiver provisions
by junior lien holders in bankruptcy cases.7 ' The Objections further
argued that the enforceability of the "offending language" can only be
properly decided as part of an adversary proceeding. 73
The New World court issued a final order approving the DIP
financing, the use of cash collateral, and the adequate protection finding
(the "Order").74 The Order specifically approved the subordination of
payment of the junior creditors to the senior creditors.75 However, the
Final Order did tone down the "offending language" which originally
provided:
The rights and remedies of the Prepetition Junior
Lenders with respect to the Subordinate Obligations, if
any, shall only be exercised in a manner consistent with
and subject to the Prepetition Credit Agreement and
Prepetition Participation Agreements.
The Final Order replaced that language with the following:
38. Prepetition Participation Agreement.
Notwithstanding anything in this Order to the
contrary, the Prepetition Participation Agreements
70. See 2004 WL 1484987 at *2.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. In re New World Pasta, No. 04-02817 (M.D. Pa. filed May 10, 2004) (issuing Final
Order Authorizing (A) Secured Postpetition Financing on a Super Priority Basis Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 364, (B) Use of Cash Collateral Pursuant to II U.S.C. § 363, and (C) Grant of
Adequate Protection Pursuant to II U.S.C. §§ 363 and 364, entered July 9, 2004.).
75. Id. at 9, 25-26.
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are in full force and effect and nothing herein shall
alter, modify, amend or effect the terms and
conditions of the Prepetition Participation
Agreements, and nothing herein is or shall be
deemed a waiver of any rights or remedies of the
Prepetition Agent or Prepetition Senior Lenders
thereunder. Nothing in this order shall be deemed to
alter, amend, prejudice or waive the rights of the
Prepetition Senior Lenders or the Prepetition Junior
Lenders with respect to the Subordinate Obligations
under the Prepetition Credit Agreement and the
Prepetition Participation Agreements, provided,
however, that in the event a court of appropriate
jurisdiction finds that the Prepetition Junior
Lenders' and/or JLL's agreements and waivers
contained in the Prepetition Agent preserves its
rights to enforce such agreements and waivers
retroactively to the Petition Date, including revoking
any protections previously granted to the Prepetition
Junior Lenders and/or JLL (including, without
limitation, those protections contained in that certain
Stipulation and Agreed Interim Order entered by this
Court on May 10, 2004, and any final order entered
with respect thereto), which protections upon such
revocation shall be deemed void ab initio and of no
force and effect.
There is no reported decision which explains the basis for the
court's order for the original "offending language" to be revised in a
way that clearly reserves any disputes concerning the enforceability of
the waiver provisions in the Subordination Agreement for another day.
However, counsel involved in the dispute have shared that the
Objections were resolved consensually. Specifically, the "offending
language" and any appearance of approval of the underlying waivers or
injunctive or declaratory relief was removed and replaced with
reservations of rights by all. In other words, the fight was reserved for a
later day.
While the New World Pasta case does not provide a clear
2005]
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answer to the question of enforceability of the types of waivers typically
found in silent second liens, it is instructive in many ways. First, the
Final Order was issued in July 2004 and confirms that there are no clear
answers to the question at hand. Second, the objection suggests that
approval of DIP financing, cash collateral, and adequate protection in
bankruptcy cases involving prepetition facilities with second liens may
be construed as a blessing of the underlying loan documents and the
waivers they contain. The ultimate change in the language seems to
imply that such a conclusion is possible and may in fact act as an
estoppel against raising the issues later. Finally, the New World Pasta
case also shows that the issue may not be resolved once and for all in a
reported decision because many cases which involve enforceability of
the silent second lien will be settled either on their own or as part of a
larger settlement. Once a bankruptcy case is filed, time is short. As
discussed above, DIP financing and cash collateral need to be in place
essentially before the case is filed. In a majority of the cases, the
borrower/debtor is so highly leveraged, there is no ability to wage a
successful priming fight and prepetition lenders are the only game in
town. Issues need to be resolved quickly and no one benefits, not the
least of which the junior lenders, if precious time is lost and the
borrower's money is spent on litigating these issues. Settlement is in
everyone's best interest. An area where it may be worthwhile to litigate
the waivers may be at plan confirmation time and the enforcement of
voting waivers. However, it is likely that by the time of plan
confirmation, most of the issues will have also been consensually
resolved by the parties over the course of the case.
3. Payment of Post-Petition Interest to Senior Lien Holder
As noted earlier in this Article,7 6 payment of post-petition
interest to the senior lender can be an important issue. Due to a recent
opinion issued by the First Circuit, this area has received a lot of
attention. Generally, intercreditor or subordination agreements provide
that senior lien holders must be paid in full prior to junior lien holders
receiving any payment. Until recently, it was generally accepted that if
the document contained "precise, explicit and unambiguous" language
76. See supra Part II.B.I.
[Vol. 9
"SILENT" SECOND LIENS
indicating that the senior creditors would receive post-petition interest
from funds which otherwise would be payable to subordinate creditors,
then the so called "Rule of Explicitness" is complied with, the language
will be enforced and the senior creditor can receive payments of post-
petition interest. However, the recent Bank of New England
77
bankruptcy case appears to have nullified, at least in the First Circuit,
the Rule of Explicitness and disturbed the established landscape in the
name of overriding bankruptcy policy against bankruptcy specific state
law.78
The rationale behind the Rule of Explicitness recognizes that
parties may use subordination agreements to consent to payment of
post-petition interest to senior creditors from funds that would otherwise
go to subordinated creditors. 79 The Rule of Explicitness, as described
by one court, is federal common law that seeks to protect junior
noteholders from the seemingly inequitable result of allowing senior
noteholders more than they would be allowed in bankruptcy, at the
expense of the junior noteholders who might not have thought about this
result at the time of the execution of the subordination agreement.
80
Under the Bankruptcy Code, it is established that an unsecured creditor
cannot receive post-petition interest on account of its claim.
8
'
Accordingly, since an unsecured creditor in an insolvent case is not
entitled to receive post-petition interest, courts were reluctant to allow
senior creditors to receive post-petition interest from junior creditors
when that interest would not have been recoverable by the senior lender
from the debtor. Over time, the equitable doctrine of the Rule of
Explicitness evolved so that unequivocal language in a subordination
agreement could overcome the general prohibition on receiving post-
petition interest.82 Thereafter, the Rule of Explicitness paved the way to
77. In re Bank of New England, 364 F.3d 355 (1st Cir. 2004).
78. See 24 BANK. L. LETTER No. 11, 1 (November 2004).
79. In re Southeast Banking Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 178, 182, 688 N.Y.S.2d 484, 710 N.E.2d
1083, 1085, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. ((RR) 326 (1999)).
80. See Honor S. Heath & James J. Tancredi, The Ingenuity of Subordinated Debt, 18
AM. BANK. INST. J. 10, (Oct. 1999) (citing In re Southeast Banking, 179 F.3d 1307, 1309
(11 th Cir. 1999)).
8 1. Congress codified the longstanding practice of disallowing post-petition interest on
unsecured claims in both the 1988 Act (in § 63a(l) & (5)) and the current Bankruptcy Code
(in § 502(b)(2)).
82. See, e.g., In re Times Sales Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1974); In re King
Resources, 385 F.Supp. 1269 (D. Co. 1974), affd 528 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1976); see also
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justify the use of the bankruptcy court's equitable powers in allowing
the payment of post-petition interest to senior lenders.
In an attempt to harmonize the Rule of Explicitness with the
Bankruptcy Code § 510(a) requirement of enforcing subordination
agreements, the Court of Appeals in New York, in Southeast Banking8 3
stated: "New York law would require specific language in a
subordination agreement to alert a junior creditor to its assumption of
risk and burden of allowing the payment of senior creditor's post-
petition interest demand. 8 4 Later, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the
Rule of Explicitness in a second Southeast Banking case, but compared
the language in the subordination agreement before it (requiring that
senior notes were to paid "in full" before junior noteholders were to
receive any payment) and found that the language was insufficiently
precise and thus did not satisfy the requirements of the Rule of
Explicitness.
To understand the impact of the First Circuit's ruling, and the
reasoning for the decision, an analysis of the facts in the Bank of New
England case is necessary. The case before the First Circuit involved
six separate series of debt instruments issued by the Bank of New
England in the total amount of $706 million. 6 Three issues of the
senior debt were entitled to contractually agreed upon subordination
pursuant to provisions in the trust indentures for the three remaining
issues of junior debt:
The Company agrees that upon... any payment or
distribution of assets of the Company... to creditors
upon any dissolution or winding up or total or partial
liquidation or reorganization of the Company, whether
voluntary or involuntary or in bankruptcy, insolvency,
receivership, conservatorship or other proceedings, all
principal ... and interest due or to become due upon all
Richard E. Mikels, et al., Subordination Agreements Case Highlights Conflict with State
Law, 23 AM.BANK. INST. J. 12 (Dec./Jan. 2005).
83. In re Southeast Banking Corp., 179 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999), 93 N.Y. 2d
178, 182 (1999).
84. Id.
85. Heath, supra note 43; see also 179 F.3d at 1307.
86. In re Bank of England, 364 F.3d 355, 355 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Senior Indebtedness ... shall first be paid in full...
before any payment is made on account of the principal
of or interest on the [Junior] indebtedness....
Later, in 1991, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed by
Bank of New England.88 The estate took over 10 years to administer
and the Chapter 7 trustee made three distributions which complied with
the subordination provisions and made the payments to the senior
creditors only.89  The three distributions were for all outstanding
principal plus accrued interest on senior debt to the date of the filing of
the petition. 90 Thereafter, the trustee sought permission to distribute an
additional $11 million to the holders of the junior debt.91 The indenture
trustees for the senior debt, however, objected, claiming that the
subordination provisions attached to the junior debt required payment of
post-petition interest on the senior debt before any amounts could be
paid on the junior debt.92 The accrued post-petition interest on the
senior debt greatly exceeded the $11 million available for distribution.93
Relying upon the Rule of Explicitness, though, the bankruptcy court
overruled the objection of the senior debt and authorized the trustee to
distribute the $11 million to the holders of the junior debt, and the
district court affirmed.94 The bankruptcy court easily found that under
the Rule of Explicitness, "creditors are not entitled to post-petition
interest in bankruptcy proceedings absent express language to that affect
in subordination agreements ordering priorities among the contracting
parties. 95 The cases have uniformly concluded that general language
providing that "all principal and interest on all senior debt shall first be
paid in full ... is insufficiently express to relate to post-bankruptcy
interest., 96 In the court's opinion, while subordination agreements are
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 364 F.3d at 361.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. BANKR. L. LETTER, supra note 78, at 2.
95. 93 N.Y.2d at 186.
96. In re Kingsboro Mortg. Corp., 514 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir. 1975); accord In re
Southeast Banking Corp., 179 F.3d 1307, 1310, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 755, 42 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 639, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 77953 (1 1th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter
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uniformly acknowledged pursuant to § 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
proper implementation of such a subordination agreement among
unsecured creditors with respect to distributions from a bankruptcy
estate, however, is inevitably obscured by the principle of both English
and American bankruptcy law disallowing post-petition interest on
unsecured claims. 97 Accordingly, the issue was reduced to whether it is
ever possible to allow the payment of post-petition interest on a
unsecured claim when there is a clear provision of the federal
Bankruptcy Code which prohibits such payment.
As in the Southeast Banking case, the applicable state law in the
Bank of New England case was that of New York pursuant to choice of
law provisions in all of the relevant debt instruments.98 The First
Circuit concluded that the only New York state law that could
legitimately be incorporated by § 510(a) is bankruptcy-neutral state
law. 99 Specifically, the court stated:
One thing seems very clear: in keeping with the
principle that bankruptcy is an area of distinct federal
competence, Congress has conferred on the federal
courts the power to apply any and all generally
applicable state rules of contract interpretation in
construing subordination agreements. But section
510(a) does not vest in the states any power to make
bankruptcy-specific rules: the statute's clear directive
for the use of applicable nonbankruptcy law leaves no
Southeast Banking III]; Matter of King Resources Co., 528 F.2d 789, 791-92 (10th Cir.
1976) [Bankr. Serv., L Ed. § 25:386]; In re Time Sales Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 841, 844
(3d Cir. 1974).
97. See Nicholas v. U.S., 384 U.S. 678 (1996). Mr. Justice Holmes first articulated this
rule as a precept of American bankruptcy law:
For more than a century and a half the theory of the English bankrupt
system has been that everything stops at a certain date. Interest was not
computed beyond the date of the commission. Ex parte Bennet, 2 Atk.
577. As appears from Cooke, the rule was laid down not because of the
words of the statute, but as a fundamental principle. We take our
bankruptcy system from England, and we naturally assume that the
fundamental principles upon which it was administered were adopted by
us when we copied the system.... No one doubts that interest on
unsecured debts stops.
Id.
98. In re Bank of England, 364 F.3d 355, 360 (1st Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 365.
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room for state legislatures or state courts to create
special rules pertaining strictly and solely to bankruptcy
matters.l1°
According to the First Circuit, then, express adoption of the
Rule of Explicitness by the New York Court of Appeals in Southeast
Banking was essentially irrelevant because that court was fashioning an
invalid bankruptcy-specific rule.'O° The First Circuit determined that
the only state law which could be applied to determine whether post-
petition interest was properly payable to a senior lender under a
subordination agreement is applicable state law which must be
"bankruptcy neutral." 10 2 Of particular significance is the court's holding
that state laws which are created to only apply in the context of
bankruptcy should be given no deference.10 3 Having invalidated the
New York Court of Appeals' adoption of the Rule of Explicitness, the
First Circuit considered the senior debt's entitlement to post-petition
interest pursuant to the terms of subordination agreement, construed in
accordance with generally applicable, bankruptcy-neutral principles of
contract law.' °4  The court concluded that the language of the
subordination agreement was ambiguous as applied to the issue of post-
petition interest and, therefore, remanded "for fact-finding on the
parties' intent vis- -vis post-petition interest."
10 5
Clearly, the issues surrounding the validity of Rule of
Explicitness in the First Circuit and, if valid, what needs to be placed in
an intercreditor agreement which will be enforced to provide for post-
petition interest to be paid to senior creditors either in accordance with
the Rule of Explicitness or some other "generally applicable,
bankruptcy neutral principle of contract law" are far from resolved.
Additionally, the Bank of New England case complicates matters
further, and perhaps the post-petition interest issue is lost, as it slips into
a dark tunnel of controversy concerning conflict of law provisions and
the intersection of federal bankruptcy policy and state law.
100. 364 F.3d at 364.
101. Id. at 366.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 355; see also Mikels, et al., supra note 82, at 12..
104. 364 F.3d at 366-67.
105. Id. at 368; see also Mikels, et al., supra note 82, at 14.
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4. Voting Restrictions and Waivers
In In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership10 6 a bankruptcy
court was faced with an action commenced by the senior creditor to
enforce a provision in the subordination agreement that stripped the
junior lien holder of its right to vote on a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization. 0 7 The court upheld the payment subordination pursuant
to the terms of the subordination agreement and specifically recognized
the validity of subordination agreements pursuant to § 510 of the
Bankruptcy Code.'0 8 However, the court determined that subordination
affects only the priority of payment and that § 510(a) does not allow for
a waiver of voting rights pursuant to § 1126(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.' 09 Specifically, the court refused to enforce the junior creditor's
prepetition waiver of its right to vote on a plan because: (i)
prebankruptcy agreements do not override contrary provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code; (ii) § 510(a), in directing enforcement of
subordination agreements, does not allow for a waiver of voting rights
under § 1126(a) of the Bankruptcy Code; (iii) Bankruptcy Rule 3018(c)
does not allow for voting of the subordinated creditor's claim by the
secured creditor; and (iv) stripping a junior creditor of a right to vote is
inconsistent with bankruptcy policy given the junior creditor's potential
"substantial interest in the manner in which its claim is treated."" 0 The
court stated:
It is generally understood that prebankruptcy agreements
do not override contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.... Indeed, since bankruptcy is designed to
produce a system of reorganization and distribution
different from what would obtain under non-bankruptcy
law, it would defeat the purpose of the [Bankruptcy]
Code to allow parties to provide by contract that the
provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Code do not apply."'
106. 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2000).
107. Id. at 328.
108. Id. at 325.
109. Id. at 327.
110. 246 B.R. at 332; see also In re New World Pasta Company, 2004 WL 1484987 at
*5 (Limited Objection).
111. 246B.R.at331.
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Two other cases addressing voting restrictions have reached the
opposite conclusion, however. In Inter Urban Broadcasting,"2 a
debtor, a senior creditor, and a junior creditor entered into a
subordination and intercreditor agreement, pursuant to which, among
other things, the junior creditor assigned and subordinated its claims,
rights and collateral to the senior creditor until the senior creditor was
paid in full." 3 Part of the proceeds from the loan from the senior
creditor were used to pay down the obligation secured by the junior
loan.' '4 In the subsequent bankruptcy, the senior creditor tendered a
competing plan which essentially provided for the senior creditor to
receive partial repayment and the junior creditor to receive nothing.'
The senior creditor voted in favor of its plan on behalf of itself and the
junior creditor, and the debtor objected. 16 The bankruptcy court denied
confirmation of the debtor's plan and confirmed the senior secured
creditor's plan.111  The debtor appealed to the district court."
8 The
district court noted that the junior creditor benefited from the senior
loan and that no one had established that the agreement could not be
enforced." 9 Accordingly, the court upheld the intercreditor agreement
and held the senior creditor's vote on behalf of itself and the junior
creditor was "proper and in accordance with the law."
121
In a case that pre-dates both LaSalle and Urban Broadcasting,
the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dealt with
voting issues as well as more broadly with intercreditor 
agreements.'12
Pursuant to a separate agreement, the bank senior lender agreed to be
subordinate to the senior working capital lender.
22  The borrower
defaulted, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, and sought to have a plan confirmed pursuant to which it had
separately classified the senior and junior lien holders.' 23 The junior
112. In re Inter Urban Broadcasting, 1994 WL 646176 (E.D. La. 1994).
113. Id.
114. id. at *2
115. Id. at * 1-2.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *1.
118. In re Inter Urban Broadcasting, 1994 WL 646176 (E.D. La. 1994).
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id.
121. In re Curtis Center Ltd. P'Ship., 192 B.R. 648 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
122. Id. at 651.
123. Id. at 655-56.
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lien holder (the bank senior lender) voted in favor of the plan. 124 The
senior working capital lender objected noting that the junior lien holder
had no right to vote for or against the plan pursuant to the restrictions in
the intercreditor agreement. 125 The court noted that the senior lender
had made it clear during the case that, pursuant to the subordination
agreement, it had the right to vote the junior lender's claim, and, as
such, the plan could not possibly be confirmed. 2 6 The court held that
the unambiguous language of the subordination agreement was
enforceable and that the debtor could not rely on the junior lien holder's
acceptance of the plan to satisfy the requirement of receiving an
acceptance by an impaired class for purposes of "cramdown" pursuant
to § 1 129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code.127
5. Proofs of Claim
As part of a silent second lien arrangement, it is common to
provide in the intercreditor agreement that a senior creditor can file a
proof of claim on behalf of a junior lien holder. In Davis
Broadcasting 1 8 two creditors of the debtor had entered into a
"Continuing Subordination and Pledge Agreement" which gave the
senior creditor superior lien rights over the junior creditor as well as
granted the senior creditor additional rights in the case of default and/or
future bankruptcy. 29 More specifically, the senior creditor was granted
the right to file a proof of claim and vote in the event of a bankruptcy
proceeding. 3 ° A bankruptcy was filed, the senior creditor filed the
proof of claim and voted on its and the junior creditor's behalf in favor
of the Chapter 11 plan.'' The junior creditor did not object and a
substantial consummation order was entered. 32 Over a year later, the
junior creditor petitioned the court to reopen the case to correct what it
124. Id. at 659-60.
125. Id. at 660.
126. Id.
127. In re Curtis Center Ltd. P'Ship., 192 B.R. 648 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
128. In re Davis Broadcasting, Inc. 169 B.R. 229 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994).
129. Id. at 230.
130. Id. at 231.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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called an "error" in the confirmation process.133 The bankruptcy court
rejected the junior creditor's motion and essentially enforced the
Subordination and Pledge Agreement as written, nothing that the junior
creditor had freely entered into the subordination agreement.
134
C. Practical Suggestions to Address Enforceability Concerns
The cases examined in this Article establish that bankruptcy
courts definitely acknowledge and will enforce subordination
agreements pursuant to § 510 of the Bankruptcy Code to the extent that
such subordination provisions relate to payment and priority of
payment. When it comes to the enforcement of subordination
agreements in the nature of waivers of voting rights, ability to file a
proof of claim, receive adequate protection and other similar waivers
and restrictions on the rights of junior lenders, courts have issued
differing opinions. The following suggestions are a few which may
help in receiving a finding from a bankruptcy court enforcing certain
waiver provisions.
As to the payment of post-petition interest, senior creditors
would be wise to carefully craft language that is "precise, explicit and
unambiguous" making it clear to junior noteholders that their payment
of the senior creditors' interest may entitle the senior creditors to
receive more in a bankruptcy case than the Bankruptcy Code will allow.
Even if the Rule of Explicitness is not recognized by a court, if the
language is sufficient to create a right to receive the payment under
bankruptcy neutral applicable state contract law, then the standard may
be met. The suggestion from the Bank of New England court that the
language must meet bankruptcy neutral applicable state law provides
nothing more than a murky standard for which no clear direction has
been established. Frankly, if a court in the First Circuit, or other court
deciding to adopt the Bank of New England rationale, accepts that
because the Rule of Explicitness conflicts with a bankruptcy policy
against the payment of post-petition interest to a senior lender when it
would not have been entitled to receive it from the debtors, it is hard to
imagine how any language could clear the established bar. For now, in
133. Id.
134. In re Davis Broadcasting, Inc. 169 B.R. 229, 235 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994).
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the First Circuit, lenders still have much to be concerned about. In all
other circuits, until decisions are issued, lenders should continue to be
as precise as possible in all language concerning the payment of post-
petition interest, the circumstances of the payment and explain exactly
what the junior lien holder is agreeing to in the intercreditor agreement.
Additionally, any language clearly spelling out the intent of the parties
with respect to the payment of post-petition interest could be helpful.
As to voting waivers, the LaSalle court and others clearly state
that § 1126 rights under the Bankruptcy Code cannot be contracted
away. However, the Davis and Urban Broadcasting courts seem to
recognize the sophistication of the parties and the enforceability of
waivers of voting rights. One possible way to address the decision in
LaSalle is to make sure that the provisions in the intercreditor
agreement concerning voting are sufficient to create an agency
relationship between the junior and senior secured lenders rather than a
transfer of waiver of voting rights. 35 If the senior lender is an agent to
vote the claim of the junior lender then the issue of altering § 1126
rights might not be an issue. Additionally, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 3018(c) specifically provides that an acceptance or rejection
of a Chapter 11 plan must be by "the creditor.., or authorized agent."
A note of caution, however. The LaSalle court specifically discussed
the application of Rule 3018(c) and concluded that, because an "agent"
is understood to act at the direction of the principal, and because in the
LaSalle case the senior creditor would be acting in its own interest, the
senior creditor could not vote the junior creditor's claim as its agent.
The question is left open, however, if a different result is warranted
when a direct agency relationship is established by contract rather than
seeking a determination by the court that an agency relationship is
created based on conduct.
As to waivers not involving voting rights, given the implication
of the New World Pasta case, careful attention should be paid at the
time of the approval of DIP financing, cash collateral, and adequate
protection orders. Depending upon which constituency counsel is
advocating for, objections and global reservations of rights (similar to
those in the New World Pasta Final Order) may be appropriate.
135. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Subordination Agreements and Voting
Right: Will Your Intercreditor Agreement be Enforced? 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32
(Jul./Aug. 2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is much about the enforcement of many commonly
included provisions in the subordination documentation for silent
second lien loans which remains unclear. While there is some case law
which addresses the enforceability of agreements for the subordination
of payment and priority of payment, which can be applied by analogy,
there is still no absolute direction and precedent. It is clear, however,
that the second lien market is one which can benefit lenders and
borrowers alike, and one which appears will remain part of the lending
landscape for quite some time. First lien holders would be wise to
address some of the suggested drafting issues noted herein and to fully
understand the risks associated with the possible inability to enforce all
of the "silence" provisions generally included in the second lien loan
documentation. Second lien holders really have nothing to lose
because, in the end, they may find themselves in a stronger position
than originally bargained for. Borrowers also do not have too much to
be concerned about since, for now anyway, they can enjoy the greater
availability of financing options available to them, as well as the more
favorable pricing (as compared to unsecured debt) which is associated
with second lien financings.
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